Assessing the Threat Level of Software Supply Chains with the Log Model

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Abstract—The use of free and open source software (FOSS) components in all software systems is estimated to be above 90%. With such high usage and because of the heterogeneity of FOSS tools, repositories, developers and ecosystem, the level of complexity of managing software development has also increased. This has amplified both the attack surface for malicious actors and the difficulty of making sure that the software products are free from threats. The rise of security incidents involving high profile attacks is evidence that there is still much to be done to safeguard software products and the FOSS supply chain.

Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools and the study of attack trees help with improving security. However, they still lack the ability to comprehensively address how interactions within the software supply chain may impact security.

This work presents a novel approach of assessing threat levels in FOSS supply chains with the log model. This model provides information capture and threat propagation analysis that not only account for security risks that may be caused by attacks and the usage of vulnerable software, but also how they interact with the other elements to affect the threat level for any element in the model.

Index Terms—software supply chain, threat propagation, open source, software build, formal model

I. INTRODUCTION

The security of technological supply chains is a hot topic especially for software, with a growing amount of high-profile attacks [1], [2], like the highly-publicized one on SolarWinds product Orion [3]. While security of supply chains for manufacturers have been deeply studied for years, the way software is produced, stored, and distributed adds different challenges to the security of supply chains for software [4], [5]. Most software systems depend on many third party free and open source software artifacts [6], [7] that have been copied, transformed, or combined to form the executable software product. Each of those artifacts, in turn, might be a combination of other software artifacts, and so on, recursively forming the software supply chain for the final software product. If any of those components is vulnerable or compromised there is a possibility that the end software products of the related Software Supply Chain (SSC) may be be affected.

The study of software dependencies (e.g., source code, libraries, other components) has been the main focus of software development practitioners [8] and empirical researchers [9]. Such analyses target different goals: to check for license compliance issues [10], or to determine the vulnerability of a software product. Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools [11] usually help by generating a list of dependencies for a package and then searching for vulnerable or compromised components that were included with it [12]. The purpose of these analyses is to propagate knowledge about dependencies up to the end product. Yet, propagating security threat information only from components identified as "parts" of the end product is not satisfactory. In [2], authors pointed out that there was mainly two strategies to compromise a software product: compromising the host of the build process, or compromising the storage and distribution infrastructure of software artifacts.

The presence of vulnerabilities in the operational part of the software supply chain can make it possible for an attacker to compromise software artifacts in the build environment used during builds. Compromised tools executed to carry out required steps such as compilation, linking or packaging of the software are even more concerning in terms of security than a vulnerable library as they may contain code that runs at build time to inject delayed attacks. The already mentioned SolarWinds'Orion attack [3] is a perfect example of this.

In terms of threat modeling and attack scenario description, the state of the art of research is to rely on attack trees [13]. This formalism is generally used to describe attacks or threat for classes of systems without accounting for any specific knowledge of it. Hence, there is a lack of formalism that integrates insights about vulnerable or compromised software artifacts, and compromised hosts that run build processes or distribute packages to determine the threat level represented by a piece of software.

Paper contributions: We propose the *log model* as the basis for an approach to keep a history of software supply chain activities for a given software product, which allows practitioners to gather a better picture of the threat level represented by a software component. We then propose an algorithm to calculate the resulting propagated security status for any element of the supply chain captured by the model. Such approach is complementary to direct detection procedure of malicious content in software product, but may spare a lot a time identifying the components that are most likely to actually contain malicious code or the most critical vulnerabilities.

Paper structure: Section II details related works and motivating literature relevant for our proposal. Section III

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details the approach and the core elements needed to be able to carry the above mentioned analysis. Section IV details the threat levels for each entity and gives the intuition about how it can propagate down to the end products of the SSC. Section V presents the model used to capture how the software supply chain has been used to produce a given end product, or a set of related products. From those elements, section VI details the proposal for a threat level propagation analysis that can be used to grasp first insights on SSC vulnerabilities. It can also be used to determine which elements of the SSC might be compromised when additional knowledge about compromised artifacts, execution or storage resources is provided. Such cases are illustrated in section VII. Finally, section VIII presents the conclusions.

II. RELATED WORK

Core principles about supply chains security have been studied and led to the identification of abstract threat types [5] that apply to supply chains in general and to SSC specifically. Yet, we are focusing on detailed threat modeling, which is most often part of Cyber-Threat Intelligence and is close to detection concerns [14]. Attack trees [13] and attacks graphs are two complementary tools for identifying and describing attack requirements and to reason about attack propagation.

The most up to date attack tree in this field is provided by Ladisa et al. [2] extending previous work by Ohm et al. [1]. It identifies three main vectors to carry out attacks by compromising or abusing: the way software source code is contributed and injected into software supply chains, build environments, or the distribution infrastructure of software (e.g., package managers, repositories). Hence, we cover two out of three of the main attack vectors, but the coverage of repositories is less clear as the attack scenarios most often do not assume compromised repositories but abuses of the mechanisms and bad practices when it comes to consume software. This point of view is consistent with the general understanding of the core issues a SSC has to cope with [15].

Examples of attack graphs integrating attacks steps on the supply chain can be found in [16]. The advantage of attack graphs over attack trees is that they should account for the actual system for which one wants to determine whether a piece of software is a threat. The main issue of this contribution is that the knowledge of compromised software artifacts should be an input of the graph model. Instead, the graph simply accounts for such events, not helping to see how such events propagate into software supply chains.

Other graph-based strategies have been proposed to better identify or detect vulnerabilities by trying to understand changes in versions and evaluating how they change the semantics to detect vulnerabilities [17], [18]. Such approaches are complementary to ours. They require actual access to the source code used in the SSC and do not provide a clear strategy to study the impact of a software component vulnerability on the SSC, they only account for vulnerability of source packages. Their advantage is then to avoid too pessimistic conclusions by considering which ones are actually reachable during end product potential execution (e.g., thanks to call graph analysis). A vulnerable software in our case can have two impacts: i) introduce directly the same vulnerability in the product; ii) make some step of the SSC vulnerable and open the door to the production of a compromised end product. Hence, we provide less accurate information in terms of potential compromises, but we require less information.

From the detection point of view, the dependencies of an end product on sources are used to infer from the source code an estimate of the level of compromises or vulnerabilities for each commit in a version control system [19]. Despite the advantages of being able to determine those vulnerabilities for each commit, the propagation of their impact needs to be understood [20]. The latter publication shows how detection is interesting but limited without the means to propagate the knowledge to dependent software artifacts, build processes, execution resources, provider-consumer links, or versions histories.

Another approach to reason about software security risks is to use Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) to look for vulnerable components [21]. The leading industry standards, SWID, SPDX, and ClycloneDX, can represent software components and be automatically generated and consumed. However, there are no agreements on the data fields that should be present. Also, SBOM adoption is still lacking [22], despite many years of availability of the SPDX specification [23]. Additionally, even a comprehensive SBOM only captures a static snapshot of the dependencies for a software product. It doesn't include information on the interactions that have occurred among all the elements of the software supply chain during the build processes. Those interactions may affect threat propagations and so are necessary for our current work.

To our knowledge the existing software supply chain models and information capture approaches suffer from a lack of requirements and semantics for the dependencies that they can record. It does not make them incorrect but ultimately it does make them impossible to exploit for the kind of automated propagation analysis we target.

III. APPROACH

Our approach can be seen as an extension of usual recursive dependency analyses for vulnerable software [24]. As pointed out in the previous section, the outcome of a SSC does not only represent a threat because it may distribute vulnerable software. Since a SSC can also be a vector to distribute malicious software, our proposal offer a method to reason about both cases.

We introduce a dependency graph model that accounts for resources that were used along the software supply chain (e.g., host machines, software tools) of a given product. This model, called the *log model*, identifies different elements involved along the supply chain that have a direct role in either propagating vulnerabilities or injecting and distributing malicious code. From such a model, we define a set of generic inference rules that help to identify all the consequences of a current state of knowledge in terms of threats. These rules allows the propagation of knowledge of vulnerable or malicious software, and of vulnerable or malicious host machines along the dependencies among the SSC operations. The advantage of this approach is to combine different sources of information by using with this notion of state of knowledge, and then to infer the consequences of this state of knowledge for the end product.

Hence the first step is to decompose the main element types of the SSC. At first two types of elements are distinguished: host machines, called hosts, and software elements, called software artifacts. It helps us to distinguish components that execute something from those that could be executed. We need to be able to describe the steps of the SSC that produce something: transformers. Such components allow us to capture three distinct behaviors for software dependencies: software artifacts that carry out the operations related to transformers (e.g., compilers, packagers), artifacts that are integrated directly or indirectly to the product (e.g., libraries, source code), and artifacts that are necessary for operations of hosts (e.g., operating systems, hypervisors, containers). Because a host can be involved in different steps of the SSC, it may provide for each of these transformers a different environment in which the operation is carried out. This is the last type we introduce, the build environment, to capture the exact context in which the operations took place.

In the next section, we provide the details of the information we propose to attach to each element, and the inference rules that can be used to capture the interplay of software artifacts, hosts, build environments and transformers in terms of propagation of vulnerabilities and malicious content.

IV. A THREAT MODEL FOR SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAINS

The focus of the proposed threat model is on the impact of attacks rooted within the resources found on software supply chains. We aim to calculate the security status of any element of the software supply chain.

Definition IV.1 (Security Status Calculus). The resulting security status for an element in a software supply chain is the security status of maximum impact of all elements that contribute directly to it.

The elements necessary to perform such analyses are presented, along its possible security implication.

Definition IV.2 (Host). A host is a computer system which stores and uses software resources.

Definition IV.3 (Software Artifact). A software artifact is a named set of software parts that are made available to be executed on host machines.

Let $Q_S = [safe, vulnerable, malicious]$ be an ordered list of possible software security states for a *software artifact*. They are arranged from the lowest to the highest impact they may have on the system, where:

• **safe** - there are no known vulnerabilities reported, so it has no adverse impact on the security of the system, a priori;

- vulnerable there is at least one known vulnerability reported that makes it exploitable, but it requires at least one action from the attacker to carry the exploitation;
- **malicious** the software contains code that is already intended to perform malicious activities in a potentially automated way (e.g., open backdoors for remote shell access, injection of malicious code into other artifacts).

We consider the final security status of a software artifact the result of combining its known initial security status with the propagated security level from other elements. For the initial state we need existing security information related to vulnerable and malicious software artifacts. For vulnerable software, there has been ongoing identification efforts by the software community and to make the information searchable [25]. Let χ_{SV} be the set of software artifacts with known vulnerabilities, already extracted from such information sources.

Since the first self replicating software was crafted and observed [26], malicious software (e.g., virus, trojans) has been studied. Such software often use evasion techniques to make them harder to be detected [27]. Since we can't rely on usual software artifact identifiers (e.g., file name, version, author) or even on intrinsic ones (e.g., cryptographic hashes), malicious software databases are not feasible. One must instead rely on file system scanning and intrusion detection techniques (e.g., cryptographic hash alteration). Let χ_{SM} be the set of malicious software artifacts detected or inferred on the system by any means.

In the current work, we assume a worst case scenario: when a host is known to have being compromised, all software artifacts that come from it are considered to be malicious. However, there is an exception. There might be an uncompromised host (e.g., no attacks were reported or observed) where a malicious software was published to be distributed, but was not itself executed. If this malicious software artifact is in the supply chain for other software artifacts, this host will be considered compromised for that supply chain, because it is distributing compromised software artifacts. If, on the other hand, another safe software artifact is fetched from this same uncompromised host, as part of another software supply chain, it won't be classified as malicious for that software supply chain.

Let $Q_H = [safe, vulnerable, compromised]$ be an ordered list of possible software security states for a *host*. The list is arranged from the lowest to the highest impact they may have on the system, where:

- **safe** all software artifacts present on the system have the *safe* security status and there are no reports of security breaches of the host system;
- vulnerable there is at least one software artifact present in the host that has the *vulnerable* security status, but none that has the *malicious* security status, and there are no reports of security breaches of the host system;
- **compromised** there is at least one software artifact present in the host that has the *malicious* security status or there is at least one report of a security breach for the host.

 TABLE I

 Rules for evaluating the current security status for a host

$Status_{S}$	$Status_H$	Host result
safe	safe	safe
vulnerable	safe	vulnerable
malicious	safe	compromised
safe	compromised	compromised
vulnerable	compromised	compromised
malicious	compromised	compromised

Let $Status_S$ be the result of combining the security status of all *software artifacts* that were observed to be present in a *host* during the execution of build activities. We combine them with the initial security status of the *host* to obtain its security result.

In order to obtain the initial security status of host, it might be necessary to rely on external attack disclosures or intrusion detection techniques [28]. We assume such information is already available. Let χ_{HV} be the set of hosts that are known to be vulnerable and χ_{HM} be the set of hosts that are known to have been compromised. For a host h, let $Status_H$ be *malicious* if $h \in \chi_{HM}$, *vulnerable* if $h \notin \chi_{HM} \wedge h \in \chi_{HV}$, and *safe* otherwise. Table I presents the possible combinations of resulting security status for a *host*.

Besides providing storage and distribution functionalities for storage artifacts, hosts also provide an environment to execute *transformers*.

Definition IV.4 (Transformer). A transformer is a step of the software supply chain where specified software artifacts are executed to carry out operations (e.g., fetching, compiling, packaging) on other software artifacts to generate one or more related software artifacts.

A *transformer* has two distinct types of input software artifacts: those that carry out the execution and those that are to be acted upon. It has just one kind of output, the software artifacts that were generated.

The security status of a *transformer* is calculated in two phases. Let B_{tools} be the set of *software artifacts* that are carry out operations and A the set of all other *software artifacts*. In the first phase we calculate the combined security status of B_{tools} and A according to the table II, where column "Build tools" shows the combined security of B_{tools} , column "Other inputs" shows the combined security of *software artifacts* that are integrated directly or indirectly to the generated artifacts, and column "T1 result" shows the security status for the phase 1 of transformer calculus. The second phase will be presented later.

Definition IV.5 (Build environment). An build environment is a computer system in which software artifacts can be executed while performing activities related to generating other software artifacts.

One host can provide a number of build environments, possibly concurrently, for preparation of different software artifacts in different supply chains. The security status of a

 TABLE II

 Rules for transformer phase 1

Build tools	Other inputs	T1 result
safe	safe	safe
vulnerable	safe	safe
malicious	safe	malicious
safe	vulnerable	vulnerable
vulnerable	vulnerable	vulnerable
malicious	vulnerable	malicious
safe	malicious	malicious
vulnerable	malicious	malicious
malicious	malicious	malicious

 TABLE III

 Rules for build environment security calculus

Host status	Input artifacts	B.env result
safe	safe	safe
vulnerable	safe	safe
malicious	safe	compromised
safe	vulnerable	safe
vulnerable	vulnerable	safe
malicious	vulnerable	compromised
safe	malicious	compromised
vulnerable	malicious	compromised
malicious	malicious	compromised

build environment is the combination of the security statuses of its *host* and the *software artifacts* that were present during the build.

Vulnerable software artifacts that performed a supporting role for the *build environment*, i.e., operating system components, don't propagate vulnerabilities to the *transformer* generated artifacts, because they can't directly or indirectly modify the generated software artifacts.

On the other hand, when a malicious software is present in a *build environment*, we consider that it may have the ability to compromise other software artifacts, including the *transformer* components. For a *build environment*, we use the same set of possible security states of *hosts*, and its security status is a result of the security status of its underlining *host* combined with the security status of all input *software artifacts* that there were present. The rules are shown in the table III. The columns "Host status", "Input artifacts", and "B.env result" show respectively, the current security statuses for the *host*, input *software artifacts*, and the resulting *build environment*.

Finally we compute the second phase of the *transformer* security status by combining the results of the phase 1 (column "T1 result" in Table II) with column "B.env result" in Table III), shown in Table IV. The column "Transformer result" shows the resulting status for the *transformer*.

We now introduce the log model which captures the threat propagation contributions for the software supply chain.

V. THE LOG MODEL

We propose the *log model* to capture information about the build process of a software product. We record the actions that took place, the artifacts that were involved, and the choices that were made within a software supply chain for the building of

TABLE IV Rules for transformer phase 2

T1 result	B.env result	Transformer result
safe	safe	safe
vulnerable	safe	vulnerable
malicious	safe	malicious
safe	compromised	malicious
vulnerable	compromised	malicious
malicious	compromised	malicious

a specific software product. We also capture the topology of the data flows that took place.

We define the *log model* G_{LM} , by adding vertex types, edge types and properties to a standard property graph model G [29]. We recall it here for referencing purposes:

Definition V.1 (Log Model). Let L be a finite set of *labels*, K be a set of *property keys* and N be a set of *values*. Let $G_{LM} = (V, E, \eta, \lambda, \nu)$ be the log model for a software supply chain, where:

- V is a finite set of vertices;
- E is a finite set of edges such that $E \cap V = \emptyset$;
- η: E → V × V is a total function that maps each edge to an ordered pair of vertices;
- $\lambda: V \cup E \mapsto P(L)$ is a function that assigns to each *vertex* and *edge* a finite set of *labels*;
- ν: (V ∪ E) × K → N is a partial function that assigns property values to elements, such that the set of domain values where ν is defined is finite.

We constrain a general property graph to the set of vertices type in which we are interested in.

Definition V.2 (Vertex types). Let L(V) be the set of labels for V, such that: $L(V) \subseteq \{$ softwareArtifact, transformer, host, buildEnvironment $\}$

The vertex types defined by those labels are:

- 1) softwareArtifact see definition IV.3;
- 2) transformer see definition IV.4;
- 3) host see definition IV.2;
- 4) buildEnvironment see definition IV.5.

Let $S \in V$ be the set of all *softwareArtifact* vertices, $T \in V$ be the set of all *transformer* vertices, $H \in V$ be the set of all *host* vertices, and $B \in V$ be the set of all *buildEnvironment* vertices.

We further constrain the property graph G_{LM} to contain only the following edge types:

Definition V.3 (Edge types). Let L(E) be the set of labels for E, such that: $L(E) \subseteq \{$ hosted, executed, wasInputTo, wasPresent, generated, wasPublishedTo, transferred $\}$

The edges are all directed and their labels represent their types as explained bellow:

 hosted - an edge that designates which host provided a build environment. It connects a *host* vertex to an *buildEnvironment* vertex;

 TABLE V

 Edge types and the combination of vertices allowed

Edge type	Source vertices	Target vertices
hosted	host	buildEnvironment
executed	buildEnvironment	transformer
wasInputTo	softwareArtifact	transformer
wasPresent	softwareArtifact	buildEnvironment, host
generated	transformer	softwareArtifact
wasPublishedTo	softwareArtifact	host
transferred	host	softwareArtifact

- executed an edge that specifies which build environment was used to generate the build. It connects an *buildEnvironment* vertex to a *transformer* vertex.
- wasInputTo an edge that specifies the input of a transformation. It connects a *softwareArtifact* vertex to a *transformer* vertex.
- 4) wasPresent an edge that specifies what software artifacts were present in the *buildEnvironment* and at the host when the build process was executed. It connects a *softwareArtifact* vertex to an *buildEnvironment* or to a *host* vertex.
- 5) **generated** an edge that specifies the results of a transformation. It connects a *transformer* vertex to a *softwareArtifact* vertex.
- wasPublishedTo an edge that designates where generated artifacts were published to be consumed by others. It connects a *softwareArtifact* to a *host* vertex.
- 7) **transferred** an edge that designates where the artifacts came from. It connects a *host* vertex to a *softwareArtifact* vertex.

The edges connection rules are summarized in Table V.

An example of a *log model* property graph G_{LM} is rendered in figure 1. Hosts (vertices 1, 5 and 11) are rendered with rectangle shapes, software artifacts (vertices 2, 3, 4, 6, 9 and 10) are rendered in rounded corners. Build environments (vertex 7) and transformers (vertex 8) are rendered with diagonal corners. For brevity we show only some of the properties for each element of the graph. Element #4, a software artifact, was present in element #5, a host, which hosted element #7, a build environment, which used a virtual machine (VM) to execute element #8, a transformer. Element #2, a software artifact, was a build tool to the transformer, while element #6, a software artifact, was input to the same transformer, which generated elements #9 and #10, software artifacts. Finally, those artifacts were published to element #11, a host. In this example, those actions and characteristics were observed during the building run of element #8, the transformer.

VI. SECURITY STATUS CALCULUS

This sections defines how to calculate the software security status of the elements of a software supply chain, as captured by the *log model*. For any starting element, it is necessary to consider all the other elements among all the paths that lead to it.




Fig. 1. An example of the Log Model

We introduce the following notation for typing purposes: S, H, T, and B stand for *softwareArtifact*, *host*, *transformer*, and *buildEnvironment* vertices, respectively. We introduce the set of status $Q = \{safe, vulnerable, malicious\}$, to represent the status of both hosts and software artifacts (see IV). If a *host* has the label *malicious* it means it is equivalent to being compromised. For a given set X, $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X})$ designates the subsets of X. The list of security status Q is ordered and defined for any $X \in \mathcal{P}(Q)$ and max(X) returns the singleton equal to the greatest label in X or the empty set if X is empty. The function *parentsOf*(v: V) returns a set of parent vertices of V, possibly empty. Let *nil* be a symbol indicating no value. The sets χ_{SV} and χ_{SM} , and the *log model* are considered to be globally available to be consulted from all functions.

Definition VI.1 (Results). Let a calculated state of the security calculus be the 5-ple $Res = (q, S_V, S_M, H_V, H_M)$, where:

- $q \in Q$ is the security status of the desired element;
- S_V is a set of vulnerable softwareArtifact vertices;

Listing 1

1	function getSoftwareStatus(s: S, r_0 : Res): Res
2	let $r: Res := copyOf(r_0)$
3	let r_p : Res := getAllStatuses(s, parentsOf(s), r_0)
4	let $q: Q := \max(\text{initialSoftwareStatus}(s), r_p[1])$
5	// add this sw to the corrensponding set
6	if $q = vulnerable$ then
7	$r[2] \coloneqq r[2] \cup s$
8	if $q = malicious$ then
9	$r[3] \coloneqq r[3] \cup s$
10	return merge (q, r, r_p)

Listing 2

1 function initialSoftwareStatus(s: S): Q

2 let a,b := safe, safe3 if $s \in \chi_{SV}$ then 4 a := vulnerable5 if $s \in \chi_{SM}$ then 6 b := malicious7 return max(a, b)

- S_M is a set of malicious softwareArtifact vertices
- H_V is a set of *vulnerable host* vertices
- H_M is a set of *malicious host* vertices

All functions that can be called for getting an element status in the algorithm listings return a *Res* 5-ple so all the *host* and *softwareArtifact* vertices security states from the origins to the selected element in the *log model* will be available (see VII for use cases).

We will use the following notation for operating with instances of type Res. For any element $r = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_5)$:

- r[i] means read the x_i value;
- r[i] := y means attribute value y to element x_i ;

We will use the special helper function *merge* to define the first element q and to apply the individual unions of all other elements of the 5-tuples of type Res.

Definition VI.2 (merge). Let $merge: Q \times Res \mapsto Res$ be a function that merges two instances of 5-ples Res, such that: $merge(q, X, Y) = (q, x_2 \cup y_2, x_3 \cup y_3, \dots, x_5 \cup y_5)$

The entry point for the algorithm for calculating the status of a *softwareArtifact* is shown in Listing 1. Later we will present the functions that gather information about other vertex types. We combine the initial condition of vertex s(*initialSoftwareStatus* in Listing 2) with the recursively calculated status of all parents of s.

Given a set of vertices V returned by the function *parentsOf*, we calculate the final security status by combining all V statuses, according to the specific rules for each type of vertex. We do that by calling the specific function as required, as shown in Listing 3. When any of those specific

Listing 3

1	function getAllStatuses($s: S, V_x: \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{V}), r_0: Res$): Res
2	let $r: Res := copyOf(r_0)$
3	for each $v \in V_x$
4	let $r_p:Res := getOneStatus(s, v, r_0)$
5	$r := \operatorname{merge}(\max(r[1], r_p[1]), r, r_p)$
6	return r
1	function getOneStatus(s: S, $v: V, r_0: Res$): Res
2	if $v \neq nil$ then
3	case typeOf (v) of
4	S: return getSoftwareStatus(v, r_0))
5	T: return getTransformerStatus(v, r_0))
6	B: return getBuildEnvironmentStatus(v, r_0)
7	<i>H</i> : return getHostStatus(s, v, r_0)
8	// v doesn't exist or element not known
9	let $r := \operatorname{copyOf}(r_0)$
10	r[1] := malicious
11	return r

functions are called, they call the *parentsOf* function again, recursively visiting the remaining incoming edges of the graph. There is an exceptional rule that will be presented later, which requires the knowledge of the current analyzed software artifact $s \in S$ to calculate the status of a *host*.

For a transformer node we look at the incoming edges and separate the source vertices into two sets: $B_{tools} \subseteq S$, the set of software artifacts that are build tools, and $A \subseteq V$, the set of any other vertices. For a transformer to propagate a vulnerability downstream it must come from a vulnerable component that it is used as a building block (i.e., from a wasInputTo edge). A vulnerable build tool, meanwhile, is not copied to the generated components, so its security status is not propagated. However, a malicious software artifact that is used as a build tool (e.g., a compiler, an archiver) can inject malicious code into the generated artifacts [30] and thus, it propagates the *malicious* security status. For this reason, we need to check if there is malicious status related to a building tool. If there is not, the resulting security status will result exclusively from the calculations of the other vertices. Listing 4 shows the algorithm.

There are only two possible edges that end in a *buildEnvironment* vertex $b \in B$: *hosted* and *wasPresent*. Since nothing is copied from b by a *transformer*, the *vulnerable* security status is never propagated from b. However, both a *compromised* host or a *malicious* software artifact that was present inside b could inject *malicious* code into the other software artifacts being processed by the *transformer* that executed inside b. Listing 5 shows the algorithm that calculates de security status for b.

The security calculus of a *host* is the combination of its initial security status (i.e., whether or not it was known as *compromised* during the execution of the *buildEnvironment*) with all the possible security risks that its parent vertices might

Listing 4

1	function getTransformerStatus($t: T, r_0: Res$): Res
2	let $B_{tools} \colon S := \emptyset$
3	let $A: V := \emptyset$
4	// Separate building tools from other elements
5	for each $v \in \text{parentsOf}(t)$
6	if typeOf(v) = $S \land$
7	outgoing edge of $v = wasBuildToolTo$ then
8	$B_{tools} := B_{tools} \cup \{v\}$
9	else
10	$A := A \cup \{v\}$
1	let r_t : Res := getAllStatuses(nil, B_{tools}, r_0)
12	let r_a : Res := getAllStatuses(nil, A, r_0)
13	// consider build tools status only if malicious
14	let $q: Q := safe$
15	if mailicous = $r_t[1]$ then
16	q := mailicous
17	// Merge all elements
18	return merge(max(q, $r_a[1])$, r_t , r_a)

Listing 5

2

3

4

5

6

7

```
1 function getBuildEnvironmentStatus(b: B, r_0: Res): Res
```

```
let r: Res := getAllStatuses(nil, parentsOf(b), r_0)
```


bring. The propagation rules depend on the role the *host* is performing.

When the *host* is executing a *buildEnvironment* (i.e., it is the parent of a *buildEnvironment*) vertex, the only possibility of propagating threats is when it is compromised and thus, it is able to inject malicious code. For that to happen the *host* has to be attacked or it has to execute some *softwareArtifact* that is *malicious* and was connected by a *wasPresent* edge. A *vulnerable* software that is among the supporting software from a host, but is not a building block type of dependency (i.e., it is not copied or transformed by the *transformer*) has no effect on the propagation of security status from the *host* on this role.

When the *host* is performing the role of a storage from which to transfer one or more software artifacts, the propagation rules also must account for the children (e.g., who was using each software artifact). Since in this role software artifacts are copied from the *host* to be processed by the *transformer*, the security status propagation must account for this usage. So the algorithm consider the special case where a software artifact was transferred and it is indicated in the algorithm by specifying the child s. Listing 6 shows the algorithm that calculates the security status for a *host* h,

Listing 6

1	function getHostStatus(s: S, $h: H, r_0: Res$): Res
2	let $r: Res = copyOf(r_0)$
3	if $h \in \chi_H$ then
4	r[1] := malicious
5	let $P_h: \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{V}) := \text{parentsOf}(h)$
6	let $P_{os}: \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{V}) := \{v v.edge = wasPresent \land v \in P_h\}$
7	let $r_{os} := \text{getAllStatuses}(s, P_{os}, r_0)$
8	$r := merge(max(r[1], r_{os}[1]), r, r_{os})$
9	if $r[1] = vulnerable$ then
10	$r[4] := r[4] \cup h$ // saves h in the set
11	r[1] := safe // can't propagate vuln. here
12	let r_s : $Res := copyOf(r_0)$
13	if $s \neq nil \land P_h \neq \emptyset$ then
14	// Look for a copy of s that was
15	// transferred to the host
16	let $p := x x \in P_h, id(x) = id(s)$
17	// Sw building block contribution
18	if $p \neq nil$ then
19	$r_s = \text{getOneStatus}(s, p, r_0)$
20	// if h not compromised, r_s (re)defines status
21	let $q: Q := malicious$
22	if $r[1] \neq$ malicious then
23	$q := r_s[1]$
24	$r = merge(q, r, r_s)$
25	if $r[1] = malicious$
26	// saves h in the compromised set
27	$r[5] := r[5] \cup h$
28	return r



considering the possibility where the child vertex may be the *softwareArtifact s*.

VII. USE CASES

We present use cases where the *log model* can be used to give first insights on the SSC security status and additional insights when more security information becomes available.

Use case VII.1 (Vulnerable components, but safe software products). Figure 2 shows the SSC for software artifacts App1 (i.e., vetertex 9) and Lib2 (i.e., vertex 10). Let's suppose that just after our building and publishing of those artifacts, it was disclosed by the software community that the artifacts GCC v9.0.0 (i.e., vertex 2), OS component 1 v1.0.0 (i.e., vertex 3), and OSLib1 v1.0.0 (i.e., vertex 4) are all vulnerable to attacks. Thus $\{v_3, v_4, v_5\} \in \chi_V$. By applying function getSoftwareStatus (Listing 1) on vertices 9 and 10, we are reassured that even though there were some vulnerable artifacts in the SSC, vertices 9 and 10 still have the *safe* security status. Additionally, we might want to verify if there are known attacks in the wild that exploit those vulnerabilities of vertices 2, 3 and 4. If it is so, we might want to request an audit of the host CodeForge 1 (i.e., vertex 5), because its

Fig. 2. Vulnerability in some components (shown by dashed lines), don't propagate to software products.

risk of future compromise grows when exploits are already observed in the wild.

Use case VII.2 (Vulnerable component causes vulnerable software products). Figure 3 shows the SSC for software artifacts App1 (i.e., vertex 9) and Lib2 (i.e., vertex 10). In this case, there was the late disclosure that the artifact App v7.2.0 (i.e., vertex 6) is vulnerable. Therefore, $\{v_6\} \in \chi_V$. By applying function **getSoftwareStatus** (Listing 1) on vertices 9 and 10, we see that both also have the *vulnerable* security status. Additionally, we can analyze how to patch or upgrade vertex 6 in such a way as to remove its vulnerability and prepare a new release of the software products App1 and Lib2.

Use case VII.3 (Malicious software component compromises SSC). Figure 4 shows the SSC for software artifacts Appl (i.e., vertex 9) and Lib2 (i.e., vertex 10). After the build is finished, it comes to attention that there was an attack which




Fig. 3. A vulnerability in component #9 propagates to the software products. (Vulnerabilities shown by dashed lines)

resulted of malicious code being present in the component OSLib1 v1.7.9 (i.e., vertex 4). So $\{v_4\} \in \chi_M$. By applying function **getSoftwareStatus** (Listing 1) on vertices 9 and 10 we are able to discover that both can be considered malicious (they have a high risk of being malicious). Furthermore, the result of the calculation (see VI) shows that the set of calculated compromised hosts $H_M = \{5\}$, and the set of malicious software artifacts $S_M = \{4, 9, 10\}$. We could request a security audit for the host depicted in vertex 5 and request the removal of the software products App1 and Lib2 from the host depicted in vertex 11, to prevent them to contaminate other parties.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The security of software supply chains is a growing concern and the task of assessing the threat risks associated with any given software product is non trivial.

Fig. 4. The propagation of malicious status of component #4 (shown by dotted lines)

The main contribution presented in this paper is the log *model*, an approach to keep the history of software supply chain activities that occurred during the production of a software artifact. The model allows the use of rules for tracing the threat propagation among the software supply chain elements. The application of all the rules combined with external knowledge of host compromises and vulnerabilities disclosures can help practitioners assess the security risks for software artifacts, hosts, and other elements of a SSC. Moreover, the information obtained can be used to help determine the best course of action for corrective measures, if required (e.g., what software components to patch or upgrade, what hosts to further look for security breaches). Finally, by mapping all elements in the software supply chain that may be vulnerable, the model allows practitioners to watch more closely for related exploits found in the wild and take preventive action.

For future research, it could be helpful to augment the threat propagation rules by considering temporal markers for disclosed compromises and vulnerabilities. The current proposal assumes that the set of software vulnerabilities and compromises and the set of host compromises occurred in an interval of time that overlapped with the time interval where software building took place in the software supply chain. By including fine grained temporal handling in the calculation, the model could help avoid false positives (e.g., even if there was a compromised host involved in the process, its compromise could have happened after its participation was already finished in a build, leaving other transformations going on other unrelated parts of the software supply chain).

Another area of research is the possibility of adding other external measures to the propagation calculations, such as reputation of a resource, and quantifying the threats levels in each category by range of values.

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