

# Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks

## An Introduction & How Reproducible Builds Help

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# Open Souce Software Supply Chain Attacks

[Ohm20]: Marc Ohm, Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch, Michael Meier.  
*Backstabber's Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks*. DIMVA 2020: 23-43.

# The (software) supply chain

# Supply chain attacks

A **software supply chain attack** is a particular kind of *cyber-attack* that aims at *injecting malicious code* into an otherwise *legitimate software product*.

## Notable examples

- *NotPetya* (2017): ransomware concealed in an update of a popular accounting software, hitting Ukrainian banks and major corps (B\$)
- *CCleaner* (2017): malicious version of a popular MS Windows maintenance tool, distributed via the vendor website
- *SolarWinds* (2020): malicious update of the SolarWinds Orion monitoring software, shipping a delayed-activation trojan. Breached into several US Gov. branches as well as Microsoft



# *Open source supply chain attacks*

- Is this specific to Free/Open Source Software (FOSS)? No.
- But modern **FOSS package ecosystems** are heavily intertwined.
  - Examples: NPM (JavaScript), PyPI (Python), Crates (Rust), Gems (Ruby), etc.
  - 100-10'000x packages, depending on each other due to code reuse opportunities.
  - **Reverse transitive dependencies** grow fast. A single package could be required by *thousands* of others.

# left-pad (2016)


```
1 function leftpad (str, len, ch) {  
2   str = String(str);  
3   var i = -1;  
4   if (!ch && ch !== 0) ch = ' ';  
5   len = len - str.length;  
6   while (++i < len) { str = ch + str; }  
7   return str;  
8 }
```

- Maintainer: *“I think I have the right of deleting all my stuff”*.  
“Unpublish” package.
- Impact: “many thousands of projects”, including major ones like babel and atom.
- NPM operators forcibly “ununpublish” package.

## ***Open source supply chain attacks (cont.)***


- For an attacker, code injection into (transitively) popular leaf packages has a **low opportunity cost**.
- Also, entirely open FOSS package ecosystems (≠ Linux distros) could be **easy to infiltrate**.

# (An) open source development workflow



(image from [Ohm20])

# Attack tree – Injection



(image from [Ohm20])

**Attacker's goal:** package P containing malicious code is available from download from a distribution platform *and* P is a reverse transitive dependency of a legitimate package.

# Injection vector – Typosquatting

Injection → Create New Package → Typosquatting

1. Create a **new package** with a **name similar** (e.g., Levenshtein distance  $\leq 2$ ) to an existing popular package, including malicious code. Examples:
  - squat on PyPI the Debian package name (“python-sqlite” v. “sqlite”)
  - English variants (“color” v. “colour”)
  - Unicode tricks
2. Upload it to a distribution platform (e.g., PyPI)
3. Wait for users to mistype (e.g., `pip install python-sqlite`)

Related attack vector: **Use After Free**

# Injection vector — Become maintainer

Injection → Infect Existing Package → Inject into Source → Commit (as maintainer) → Social Engineering to become Maintainer

1. Package maintainer: “I no longer have time for this project, who wants to take over its maintenance?”
2. Attacker: raises hand
3. Attacker: releases new version including malicious code

Might require early investment to accrue enough “street credibility” to win over maintenance at the right moment. For popular packages with low bus factor it could be worth it.

# Injection example – Compromise build system

Injection of Malicious Code → Infect Existing Package → Inject during the Build → Compromise Build System

- Often, the code run by users run is *written but not built* by maintainers
- Rather, it is built by **3rd-party vendors**
  - e.g., GNU/Linux distros, app store operators, arch “porters”
- It becomes attractive to **break into vendor build systems**, compromising binaries “downstream”, without anybody looking merely at source code noticing



# Reproducible Builds



<https://reproducible-builds.org/>

[Lamb22]: Chris Lamb, Stefano Zacchiroli. *Reproducible Builds: Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains*. IEEE Softw. 39(2): 62-70 (2022).

# On untrusted code

*“You can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself. [...] No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code.”*

*— Ken Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust,  
Turing Lecture 1984*


- 40 years later nobody “totally creates” code they run
- Reuse of open source software (FOSS) is everywhere in IT
  - “99% of audited code bases contain FOSS components” (Synopsis 2020)
- Also, the FOSS *we run* is often not *built* by its developers

# Problem statement

*How can we increase users' trust when running (trusted) FOSS code built by (untrusted) 3rd-party vendors?*

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
# A reproducible build (r-b) process

Precondition/hypothesis: we can “reproducibly build” all relevant (FOSS) products, i.e.:

*The **build process** of a software product is **reproducible** if, after designating a specific version of its source code and all of its build dependencies, every build produces **bit-for-bit identical artifacts**, no matter the environment in which the build is performed. — [Lamb22]*

(we'll verify later how realistic this is)

# R-B approach



# Making Debian reproducible

- Let's try a large-scale experiment: *making all Debian packages build reproducibly* from source
  - Debian: one of the largest and most popular GNU/Linux distro, esp. in the server/cloud market
  - 30'000+ (source) packages, 1+B lines of code
  - initial goal of the [reproducible-builds.org](https://reproducible-builds.org) initiative, est. 2014
- Goals:
  1. empirical experiment to map the origins of non-reproducibility
  2. real impact (if successful) due to Debian popularity in the industry

# **Build reproducibility in the small**

*How hard could it be to ensure build reproducibility?*



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After **controlling for source code, build deps., and toolchain**, two main classes of issues arise in practice:

1. **Uncontrolled build inputs:** when toolchains allow the build process to be affected by the surrounding environment.
  - Intuition: build engineering equivalent of *breaking encapsulation* in programming
2. **Build non-determinism** that gets encoded in final built artifacts.

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Let's see a bestiary of real-world examples...

# Build timestamps

```
1 void usage() {  
2     fprintf(stderr,  
3         "foo-utils version 3.141 (built %s)\n",  
4         __DATE__);  
5 }
```

- The `__DATE__` C preprocessor macro “expands to a string constant that describes the date on which the preprocessor is being run.”
- Fix: `SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH` envvar (standardized by r-b) to enable controlling for this

# Build paths

```
1 fprintf(stderr,  
2     "DEBUG: boop (%s:%s\n",  
3     __FILE__, __LINE__);
```

- The `__FILE__` C preprocessor macro “expands to the name of the current input file”. This results in non reproducibility when the program is built from different directories, e.g., `/home/lamby/tmp` vs. `/home/zack/tmp`.
- Fix: introduced `gcc -ffile-prefix-map` option (and related `-fdebug-prefix-map`) to support embedding relative (rather than absolute) paths

# Filesystem ordering

```
1  NAME
2      readdir - read a directory
3
4  SYNOPSIS
5      #include <dirent.h>
6      struct dirent *readdir(DIR *dirp);
7
8  [...] The order in which filenames are read by successive calls to
9  readdir() depends on the filesystem implementation; it is unlikely
10 that the names will be sorted in any fashion. [...]
```

- Fix: impose a deterministic order in build systems/recipes, e.g., via an explicit `sort()`

# Archive metadata

- Archive formats like `.zip` and `.tar` embeds various kinds of metadata by default
  - user/group ownership (e.g., `zack v. lamby`)
  - file modes (umask)
  - timestamps
- Fix: control for this, e.g.:
  - `tar --owner=0 --clamp-mtime=T`
  - `touch --date=$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH`

# Randomness

Even when the entire environment inputs are controlled for, many builds remain *non-deterministic*. For instance due to **randomness in unexpected places**.

```
1 my %h = ( a => 1, b => 2, c => 3);  
2 foreach my $k (keys %h) {  
3     print "$k\n";  
4 }
```

Perl's hash type does not define an ordering of its keys, so a call to `sort` should be inserted before `keys %h` to make it deterministic.

# Uninitialized memory

- Many data structures have **undefined areas** that do not affect their operation, but could end up being **serialized in build artifacts**.
- *Padding for natural memory alignment* can also be filled with random content.
- Fix: explicitly zero-out memory.

```
1  --- a/direntry.c
2  +++ b/direntry.c
3  @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
4
5  void initializeDirentry(
6      direntry_t *entry, Stream_t *Dir) {
7  +    memset(entry, 0, sizeof(direntry_t));
8      entry->entry = -1;
9      entry->Dir = Dir;
```

- A patch for [GNU mtools](#) to ensure a `direntry_t` struct does not contain uninitialized memory.



# Build reproducibility in the large

- Now let's assume we know how to fix all micro-issues that affect build reproducibility.
- How do we go about **making large FOSS software collections reproducible?**
- Use case: Debian
- Approach: establish a corresponding **Quality Assurance process** and soft-enforce it using Continuous Integration (CI)

# Adversarial rebuilding

*How do you find build reproducibility issues, at scale?*

- mass-rebuild all packages...
- ...building each of them twice...
- ...in two build environments configured to **differ as much as possible**
  - clock set 18 months in the future in 2nd build
  - changing: hostname, locales, kernel
  - reverse filesystem ordering using [disorderfs](#)
  - 30+ variations in total

# Recording build information

- According to our definition of a reproducible build, *legitimate build inputs* should be controlled for and replicated identical in the 2nd build
  - source version of product under build
  - ditto for all transitive build dependencies
  - toolchain version
- To that end, the `.buildinfo` file format has been standardized to capture these information

# .buildinfo – Example

```
1 Source: black
2 Version: 20.8b1-1
3 Checksums-Sha1:
4     9915459ae7a1a5c3efb984d7e5472f7976e996b1 2584 black_20.8b1-1.dsc
5     14bfd3011b795f85edbc8cc4dc034a91cfaa9bcd 111096 black_20.8b1-1_all.deb
6     69c3d4ae7115c51e7b00befe8b4afd5963601d66 285684 python-black-doc_20.8b1-1_all.d
7 Checksums-Sha256: [...]
8 Build-Architecture: amd64
9 Installed-Build-Depends: autoconf (= 2.69-11.1), automake (= 1:1.16.2-4), [...], gc
```

An example `.buildinfo` file, recording both the environment and results of building Debian's `black` package. (See [full version](#).)


# Build attestations

- `.buildinfo` files also contain the *cryptographic checksums of final build artifacts*, acting as **build attestations**

*I, Alice, given source  $X$ , build dependencies  $Y_1, \dots, Y_n$  and toolchain  $Z$ , have conducted a build run obtaining a set of artifacts with checksums  $K_1, \dots, K_m$ .*


- Anyone (for QA or independent verification purposes) can rerun the build and publish their own build attestations

# .buildinfo – Usage



- Before installation, users verify package checksums against published build attestations
- Published by either vendors they trust; or relying on some consensus within a network of independent rebuilders
- Debian publishes 27+M build attestations at <https://buildinfo.debian.net>

# Reproducible Debian — Evolution over time



# Quality assurance synergies

- systematic R-B testing  $\Rightarrow$  systematic **build testing**, catching any FTBFS bug
- some software will only FTBFS in the extreme R-B build environment; fixing it will make the **software more robust** in general
  - e.g., expired SSL certificates at +18 months, or unusual timezone offsets
- R-B testing can detect user-level breakages by serendipity
  - e.g., HTML documentation pointing to `/tmp/build/foo/usage.html` instead of `/usr/share/doc/foo/usage.html`



# Quality assurance synergies — security

- Security issues can also be spotted during R-B testing by serendipity

```
1 {  
2   'cgibin' => '/usr/lib/cgi-bin/gbrowse',  
3   'conf' => '/etc/gbrowse',  
4   'databases' => '/var/lib/gbrowse/databases',  
5   'htdocs' => '/usr/share/gbrowse/htdocs',  
6   'OpenIDConsumerSecret' => '639098210478536',  
7   'tmp' => '/var/cache/gbrowse'  
8 },
```

An example `ConfigData.pm`. As it was created at build time, all users shared the same `OpenIDConsumerSecret`. (See: [Debian bug #833885](#).)

# The Reproducible Builds ecosystem



<https://reproducible-builds.org/>


- 2014: project kicked started by Debian folks for ~~Debian needs~~ fun
- joined since: Arch Linux, coreboot, F-Droid, Fedora, FreeBSD, Guix, NixOS, openSUSE, Qubes, Tails
- 2017 milestone: Tails (live distro used by Snowden to exfiltrate NSA documents) publishes a fully reproducible ISO to improve end-user verifiability
- independent project hosted by Software Freedom Conservancy + corporate sponsors (e.g., Google, The Linux Foundation, Ford Foundation, Siemens)

# Challenges

- Debian reached 95% reproducible packages, can we go all the way?
  - Yes, it's just busy/constant maintenance work.
  - Working with upstream and spreading r-b culture helps a lot.
- How to make *signed build artifacts* reproducible (without distributing signing keys)?
  - Detached signatures. (Painful for distribution channels.)
- How do end-user verify build artifacts before installation?
  - Particularly challenging on locked-down mobile environments/stores.
- How little trusted code is acceptable?
  - [Bootstrappable Builds](#) managed to bootstrap from a 6 KiB trusted executable to gcc via [TCC](#).

# Takeaways

- **Open source software supply chain attacks** are a hot topic in cybersecurity right now.
- Several ACES team members have started working in this space.
- **Reproducible Builds** help countering *build/distribution injection* attacks.



- Marc Ohm, Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch, Michael Meier. *Backstabber's Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks*. DIMVA 2020: 23-43.
- Chris Lamb, Stefano Zacchiroli. *Reproducible Builds: Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains*. IEEE Softw. 39(2): 62-70 (2022).

# Appendix

# Root cause analysis – Diffoscope

|   |   |
|---|---|
| dolfinx-doc_2019.2.0~git20200128.797071f-3_all.deb                  | 1.16 KB   |
| <b>file list</b>  | 367 B   |
| Offset 1, 3 lines modified  | Offset 1, 3 lines modified  |
| 1 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 4 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>debian-binary    | 1 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 0 4 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>debian-binary    |
| 2 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 1664 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>control.tar.xz  | 2 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 1664 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>control.tar.xz  |
| 3 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 190104 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>data.tar.xz   | 3 -rw-r--r-- 0 0 190100 2020-02-03 15:41:41.000000<br>data.tar.xz   |
| <b>data.tar.xz</b>  | 625 B   |
| <b>data.tar</b>   | 603 B   |
| <b>./usr/share/dolfinx/demo/hyperelasticity/CMakeLists.txt</b>      | 587 B   |
| Offset 10, 15 lines modified  | Offset 10, 15 lines modified  |
| 10 # Get DOLFINX configuration data (DOLFINXConfig.cmake must be in | 10 # Get DOLFINX configuration data (DOLFINXConfig.cmake must be in |
| 11 # DOLFINX_CMAKE_CONFIG_PATH)                                     | 11 # DOLFINX_CMAKE_CONFIG_PATH)                                     |
| 12 if (NOT TARGET dolfinx)  | 12 if (NOT TARGET dolfinx)  |
| 13 ..find_package(DOLFINX REQUIRED)                                 | 13 ..find_package(DOLFINX REQUIRED)                                 |
| 14 endif()  | 14 endif()  |
| 15 # Executable   | 15 # Executable   |
| 16 add_executable(\${PROJECT_NAME}_hyperelasticity.c main.cpp)      | 16 add_executable(\${PROJECT_NAME}_main.cpp hyperelasticity.c)      |
| 17 # Set C++17 standard   | 17 # Set C++17 standard   |
| 18 target_compile_features(\${PROJECT_NAME}_PRIVATE cxx_std_17)     | 18 target_compile_features(\${PROJECT_NAME}_PRIVATE cxx_std_17)     |
| 19 # Target libraries   | 19 # Target libraries   |
| 20 target_link_libraries(\${PROJECT_NAME} dolfinx)                  | 20 target_link_libraries(\${PROJECT_NAME} dolfinx)                  |